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The relationship between per capita income and a number of pollution indicators has been 
found to display an inverted U-shaped or downward-sloping pattern. Corruption may affect 
this relationship in two distinct ways: by raising pollution at given income levels (direct 
effect) and by reducing per capita income (indirect effect). The total effect is ambiguous a 
priori. Using cross section data for several indicators of pollution, the paper estimates the 
direct and the indirect effect of corruption on pollution. The indirect effect via income is 
positive or negative depending on the income level. If negative, the indirect effect is 
dominated by the positive direct effect. Overall, our measures of pollution are monotonically 
increasing in corruption. Because this relationship is particularly strong at low income levels, 
developing countries can considerably improve both their economic and environmental 
performance by reducing corruption. 
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1 Introduction 
Corruption involves behavior on the part of public officials in which they unlawfully enrich 
themselves by the misuse of the power entrusted to them (Transparency International 2000). 
Corruption is not only a 'hot issue' in the public debate, but has also become an important 
field of economic research. While the literature started already in the 1970s
1, empirical 
research has begun to be undertaken only recently with the availability of data sets which 
allow the measurement of corruption levels across countries.
2 
Using cross-national data, corruption has been found to affect a variety of economic variables, 
such as total investment, GDP, government expenditure, capital flows and foreign direct 
investment, international trade, and foreign aid.
3 In addition, case studies have suggested that 
corruption is an important source of environmental degradation, especially in developing 
countries (see, e.g., the contributions in Desai 1998), but systematic quantitative assessments 
of the environmental effects of corruption are only just starting to be undertaken. 
What are the effects corruption may have on environmental pollution? The previous literature 
suggests that two partial effects can be distinguished. On the one hand, corruption may reduce 
the stringency of environmental regulation (Lopez and Mitra 2000, Damania et al. 2000) or 
the effectiveness with which environmental regulation is enforced (Hafner 1998, Lippe 1999), 
thus leading to higher pollution. On the other hand, corruption has been found to reduce 
prosperity (Mauro 1995, Hall and Jones 1999, Kaufmann et al. 1999) which, according to 
another strand of literature (Grossman and Krueger 1995, and others
4), may lead to lower 
pollution at some income levels and to higher pollution at others. Therefore, the total effect of 
corruption on the environment cannot be determined a priori. 
Given this background, the purpose of the present paper is twofold. In a first step it examines 
how corruption affects pollution at given levels of income, through corruption's effect on the 
formation and enforcement of environmental laws (direct effect). In a second step it 
investigates the influence of corruption on pollution via corruption's impact on income 
(indirect effect) and adds the indirect effect to the direct effect to obtain the total effect. 
The relationship between prosperity and a number of indicators of environmental pollution 
follows what has come to be known as Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). The EKC 
entails that economic growth brings an initial phase of environmental deterioration followed 
                                                           
1 Rose-Ackerman (1975) is the first published piece on the economics of corruption that received wide attention. 
2 Because acts of corruption are generally conducted in secrecy, corruption levels are difficult to measure. 
Recent empirical research has employed survey-based subjective indices on corruption which reflect the views 
of the international business community. 
3 For a review of empirical research see Lambsdorff (1999). 
4 See footnote 5.   3
by a subsequent phase of improvement. A frequent interpretation is that, as nations or regions 
attain higher income levels, their citizens demand that the non-material aspects of their 
standard of living be improved. The EKC is taken to be a reduced-form representation of 
these relationships (Grossman and Krueger 1995). A number of studies have supported the 
inverted U-shaped or even downward sloping income-pollution curve.
5 
The linkage between corruption and prosperity has been examined in a seminal paper by 
Mauro (1995) who found that corruption reduces economic growth. In terms of cross-national 
income levels, Hall and Jones (1999) found that per capita income is strongly linked to what 
they call social infrastructure, a construct which includes the degree to which a society is free 
from corruption. Exploring the issue in more detail, Kaufmann et al. (1999) found a strong 
negative association between corruption and per capita income. 
In contrast to the income-pollution and the corruption-income linkages, systematic analysis of 
corruption-environment interactions has only just started. This line of research so far has 
focused on endogenizing the formation of environmental policy standards, using 
governmental corruption as one of the explanatory variables (see Damania et al. 2000, 
Fredriksson et al. 2002, and Fredriksson and Svenson 2002). In contrast to these papers, the 
present paper focuses on actual pollution and emission levels as the dependent variable. These 
actual levels do not depend on the stringency of environmental standards alone, but also on 
the effectiveness with which environmental law is being enforced, and this effectiveness of 
law enforcement is likely to vary inversely with corruption.
6 
To my knowledge this paper is the first to examine both the relationship between corruption 
and observed pollution levels at given levels of income (direct effect) as well as the influence 
of corruption on pollution via corruption's impact on income (indirect effect). Following most 
of the empirical literature on the economic effects of corruption, the paper uses cross-country 
regressions. This methodology is far from ideal due to unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries. It would clearly be preferable to turn to fixed-effect models with panels of data, but 
using such a methodology is prevented by the unavailability of panel data of corruption. 
Using six indicators of ambient air and water pollution for 106 countries, the direct effect of 
corruption on pollution is found to be unambiguously positive, i.e. pollution-enhancing. The 
indirect effect via income may be positive or negative depending on the income level. Even if 
negative, the indirect effect is dominated by the direct effect, and the total effect of corruption 
                                                           
5 In addition to Grossman and Krueger (1995), see Hilton and Levinson (1998), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995), 
Selden and Song (1994), Schmalensee, Stoker and Judson (1998), and Shafik (1994). 
6 The role of corruption in environmental policy formation is also investigated in a theoretical paper by Lopez 
and Mitra (2000). In contrast to the present paper, these papers neglect the indirect effect which corruption may 
have on the environment via corruption's effect on income.   4
is to enhance pollution. Because the effect is particularly strong at low income levels, 
developing countries can considerably improve both their economic and environmental 
conditions by reducing corruption. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses methodological issues, including the 
conceptual and empirical approach, and the data used. Section 3 examines the income-
pollution relationship and the (direct) corruption-pollution relationship, taking income as 
exogenous. Section 4 introduces the corruption-income relationship and examines the total 
effect of corruption on pollution, as well as its composition in terms of the two partial effects 
described above. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Methodological Approach and Data 
 
a) Framework of Analysis  
The popular notion that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth has 
been called into question in a number of studies. As mentioned above, recent empirical 
evidence for a number of environmental indicators suggests that economic growth may 
possibly bring initial environmental deterioration which is then followed by a subsequent 
phase of improvement, a relationship referred to as Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC). 
The inverse relationship between income and pollution at higher income levels is mostly 
explained in terms of an induced policy response, in the sense that people demand stricter 
environmental standards as per capita incomes rise (see, e.g., OECD 1991). This idea is 
formalized by Antweiler et al. (2001). In their model, optimal environmental regulation 
becomes stricter as income rises, leading to lower pollution intensity of income (technique 
effect). On the other hand, rising income implies a larger scale of economic activity. Whether 
rising income increases or reduces pollution, then, depends on the relative strength of the 
scale versus technique effects, which will typically vary with the income level. 
Even if optimal environmental standards become stricter as income rises, the desire for 
stricter environmental regulation will translate into actual environmental policy only if 
citizens are able to express their preferences for environmental quality and if governments 
have an incentive to satisfy these preferences by changing policy. Based on this line of 
reasoning, Barrett and Graddy (2000) found that an increase in civil and political freedoms 
significantly improves environmental quality. In a related fashion, environmental policy 
formation is also affected by rent-seeking and corruption (Lopez and Mitra 2000, Damania et 
al. 2000). In addition, corruption may impact on pollution not only via the formation of   5
environmental laws, but also through the strictness with which these laws are enforced 
(Hafner 1998, Lippe 1999). 
These considerations suggest that pollution varies not only with income, but also with the 
degree of corruption at any given level of income. This, then, gives rise to an extended EKC, 
which can be written as follows: 
 
   p   =   f ( y ,   c ) ,          (1) 
 
where p = pollution, y = per capita income, c = corruption level. 
It follows from the literature discussed above that the partial derivative ∂p/∂c is expected to be 
positive, reflecting the adverse impact of corruption on the formation and enforcement of 
environmental laws.
7 If ∂p/∂c were restricted to zero, equation (1) would capture the usual 
EKC relationship. According to the EKC literature (see footnote 5), the sign of ∂p/∂y is 
ambiguous but likely to be negative at higher income levels. 
In the empirical specification of equation (1) we will closely follow Grossman and Krueger 
(1995), hereafter referred to as G-K, which is a standard in this literature (see section 2d). 
Estimation of equation (1) will be the first step in our analysis of the corruption-pollution 
relationship. 
In addition to the direct effect of corruption on pollution, as captured by (1), there exists an 
indirect channel through which corruption can affect pollution, as corruption has been found 
to adversely affect per capita income. In formulating the relationship between corruption and 
per capita income we follow Hall and Jones (1999), who base their analysis on a standard 
production function framework. Assuming that output (income) is a function of physical 
capital, human capital, and total factor productivity, and that this production function is linear 
homogeneous in the first two arguments, income per person depends on physical and human 
capital per person, and on productivity. Hall and Jones (1999) found that cross-country 
differences in productivity are significantly driven by differences in what they call social 
infrastructure, which includes the degree to which a society is free from corruption. 
Based on this framework of analysis we obtain the following corruption-income relationship: 
 
   y = g(k, h, c)                 ( 2 )  
                                                           
7 It should be noted that the positive corruption-pollution relationship refers to actual pollution. In addition, there 
may exist a downward bias in reported emissions, and this bias may be reasonably assumed to increase in the 
corruption level. This would induce a negative linkage between corruption and reported emissions at given 
actual emission levels. We will return to this issue later.    6
 
where k and h denote physical and human capital per person, respectively.
8 In line with Hall 
and Jones (1999) as well as Kaufmann et al. (1999) we expect ∂y/∂c to be negative. 
Estimating equation (2) is the second step in our empirical analysis, leading to the 
identification of the indirect effect of corruption on pollution and contributing to the 
derivation of the total effect. 


















=               ( 3 )  
 
In this formula, the rightmost expression represents the direct effect, which relates to the 
impact of corruption on the formation and enforcement of environmental law. The first 
expression on the right-hand side is the indirect effect via corruption's impact on prosperity. 
 
b) Indicators of Pollution 
Following much of the literature mentioned in footnote 5, we consider indicators of both air 
and water pollution. As far as the choice between ambient pollutant concentrations and 
pollution emission levels is concerned, one could argue that emission data should be used 
because emissions are more closely linked to both economic activity levels and corrupt 
practices than is ambient pollution. On the other hand, ambient pollution rather than 
emissions is what citizens will have preferences over, and what they will possibly demand to 
be restricted as prosperity rises. To avoid needless controversy on this issue we will use 
ambient pollution data as well as data on pollution emissions and environmental stresses in 
our analysis.
9 
The pollution indicators employed are listed in rows 1 through 12 of Table 1. The first six 
indicators refer directly to air and water quality, the others to environmental emissions or 
                                                           
8 It should be noted that this approach shares some common elements with the empirical growth literature 
associated with Barro (1991) and others. In the empirical specification (section 2d) we will refer to this literature 
especially with respect to the choice of proxies for human capital. Nevertheless, the current framework differs 
fundamentally in its focus on levels instead of rates of growth. There are several reasons why this focus is 
important in its own right (see Hall and Jones 1999). In the current context this focus is the result of our research 
objective. 
9 Another issue involved in the choice between ambient pollutant concentrations and emission levels is the 
reliability of the data, an aspect to which we will return later.   7
stresses.
10 In addition to the pollution indicators, we use data on per capita income, physical 
and human capital, and corruption levels, also listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: List of Variables 
1  SO2  Urban sulphur dioxide concentration 
2  NO2  Urban nitrogen dioxide concentration 
3  TSP  Urban total suspended particulate concentration 
4  GMS_DO  Dissolved oxygen demand 
5 GMS_PH Phosphorus  concentration 
6 GMS_SS Suspended  solids 
7  SO2KM  Sulphur dioxide emissions per populated land area 
8  NOXKM  Nitrogen oxide emissions per populated land area 
9  VOCKM  Volatile organic compound emissions per populated land area 
10  FERTHA  Fertilizer consumption per hectare of arable land 
11  PESTHA  Pesticide use per hectare of crop land 
12  BODWAT  Industrial organic pollutants per available freshwater 
13  GNPPC  GNP per person 
14  CAPPC  Physical capital per person 
15  ADLIT  Adult literacy rate 
16  RDPERS  Scientists and engineers per population 
17 CORR  Corruption  measure 
 
The pollution indicators (1) - (3) refer to ambient air quality. Their major anthropogenic 
sources include the combustion of fossil fuels in electricity generation, certain chemical and 
industrial processes, home heating, and car traffic. 
The indicators (4) - (6) measure water quality. Increasing dissolved oxygen demand (or 
likewise decreasing dissolved oxygen concentration) indicates contamination by organic 
carbon contained in sewage, industrial discharges, or the runoff from agricultural areas. 
Phosphorus concentration is mainly related to fertilizer use in agriculture, whereas suspended 
solids stem from agriculture, mining, and industry (including refineries). 
The emissions of air pollutants (7) - (9) and water pollutants (10) - (12) are the stresses which 
cause environmental degradation as measured by the ambient pollution indicators (1) - (6). 
                                                           
10 These are the major indicators of environmental quality and environmental stresses identified and compiled in 
the Environmental Sustainability Index initiative (see WEF/YCELP/CIESIN 2001).   8
Sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides result from fuel combustion. Major sources of volatile 
organic compounds include car traffic, fuel distribution, and refineries. The use of fertilizers 
and pesticides is, of course, related to agriculture whereas industrial organic pollutants refer to 
industrial discharges. 
Given that the various types of ambient pollution and emissions predominantly originate from 
different sectors of the economy, the sectoral economic structure of a particular country can 
be expected to have an impact on its pollution profile. In addition, the income-pollution 
relationship of countries in which resource rents (especially from oil and gas) represent a 
major fraction of national income may be different from that of other countries. We will 
attempt to capture such influences, at least in a tentative way, by using country dummies.  
 
c)  Sources and Description of Data 
The pollution indicators (1)-(12) listed in Table 1 have been assembled for 122 countries in 
the context of an effort to construct a global Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). For a 
detailed description of the original data, their sources, and the way in which the final data 
base was prepared see WEF/YCELP/CIESIN (2001). 
The ESI air quality indicators (1)-(3) are from the World Health Organization's Air 
Management Information System (AMIS) and refer to the most recent year available (MRYA) 
within the time period of 1990-96. The water quality indicators (4)-(6) are based on data from 
the United Nations Environment Programme's Global Environmental Monitoring System 
(GEMS) and are averages over 1994-96 or MRYA. The air pollution emission indicators (7)-
(9) are based on data from the Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research 
(EDGAR) of the Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) 
and refer to 1990. Fertilizer use (10) and industrial organic pollutants (12) are taken from the 
World Bank's World Development Indicators 2000 for 1997 and 1996 respectively, and 
pesticide use (11) comes from the World Resources Institute's World Resources 2000-2001 
for 1996. A major difference between the data on emissions and environmental stresses (7) - 
(12) and the ambient pollution data (1) - (6) is that the former have been compiled from 
national sources whereas the latter come from international monitoring programs. 
The data on scientists and engineers (16)
11 and corruption levels (17) are also from the ESI 
databank. The former refer to the MRYA within the period 1980-97 and are based on the 
                                                           
11 This variable, jointly with the adult literacy rate (15), will serve as a proxy for human capital per person in 
equation (2). A discussion of this choice of proxies is provided in section 2d.   9
UNESCO's  Statistical Yearbook 1999. Corruption levels are from the World Bank (see 
Kaufmann et al. 2000)
12 and refer to 2000.
13 
The final data included in the ESI and used in this paper take the form of Z scores, i.e. 
deviations of individual values from their mean, divided by the standard deviation. A Z score 
equal to zero indicates the mean for the 122 countries, a Z score equal to +1.5 or -1.5 
respectively represents 1.5 standard deviations above and below the mean, and so on. Since 
the ESI indicators have been constructed such as to correspond to high levels of 
environmental sustainability, we multiplied them by minus 1 to obtain indicators of pollution. 
GNP per capita (13) and adult literacy rates (15) were taken directly from the World 
Development Report and refer to 1994 and 1995 respectively. These reference years were 
chosen so as to achieve the best possible correspondence with the pollution indicators. The 
GNP data are PPP estimates and are in current international $. The literacy rates are in 
percent.
14  
Physical capital per person (14) is taken from the data base underlying Hall and Jones 
(1999)
15 and is expressed in $. 
The summary statistics of the data used are summarized in Table A1 in the Appendix. Their 
correlations are shown in Table A2 of the Appendix. One striking feature of the data is the 
lack of correlation between NOX emissions (NOXKM) and urban NO2 concentrations (NO2). 
With respect to SO2 emissions (SO2KM) and corresponding urban concentrations (SO2) the 
correlation is even slightly negative (-0.17). On the other hand, there is a rather high negative 
correlation (-0.88) between per capita income (GNPPC) and corruption (CORR).  
 
d)  Procedure of Empirical Analysis 
In section 3 we will examine the relationship between per capita income and pollution as well 
as between corruption and pollution, taking income to be exogenous. In other words, we will 
estimate the extended EKC, equation (1), disregarding equation (2). Following G-K, which is 
a standard in this literature, the income-pollution relationship will be specified as a cubic 
                                                           
12 This data set comprises subjective indices on corruption. One way of constructing such indices is to ask 
business people to provide an estimate of the kickback per deal (as a percentage of the deal's value) that would 
have to be paid in order to conduct business in each country. Similar data sets have originaly been developed to 
determine country ratings to be used by banks, institutional investors, or multi-national firms. Subjective 
corruption data thus are the market's choice of a corruption indicator. They are preferred over hard data, such as 
numbers of convictions for corruption, because the latter cannot capture undiscovered corruption cases and are 
of low international comparability. 
13 Because cross-country corruption profiles may not be expected to change quickly, using data for 2000 seems 
to be appropriate for our purposes. 
14 We did not transform these data into Z scores because, in contrast to the pollution indicators, the original units 
of GNP and literacy can be easily interpreted.  
15 See http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/HallJones400.asc.   10
function. This provides a sufficiently flexible form which imposes no specific shape on the 
income-pollution relationship, without being overly demanding given the data limitations.
16 
To account for possible peculiarities in economic structure, we will experiment with a dummy 
variable for OPEC countries. Corruption will be included in linear form.
17 
The general form of the equations to be estimated is: 
 
Pij = αi0 + αi1GNPPCj + αi2GNPPCj
2 + αi3GNPPCj
3+ αi4OPECj + αi5CORRj  + uij    (4) 
 
where the subscript i refers to the pollutant and the subscript j to the country. In section 3 we 
will estimate these equations separately for each pollutant, using ordinary least squares.
18 This 
serves mainly to identify preferred specifications of the way in which corruption may 
intermediate between income and pollution. 
Having selected preferred specifications for the income-pollution and corruption-pollution 
relationships, section 4 moves on to examine the corruption-income relationship, equation (2). 
As discussed in section 2a, our formulation is based on a production function framework 
along similar lines as Hall and Jones (1999). In spite of our focus on levels instead of growth 
rates (cf. footnote 8) our choice of proxies for human capital per person is informed by the 
empirical literature on economic growth. According to this literature, desirable properties of 
human capital proxies are that they should refer to stocks (not to flows, such as school 
enrolment rates or numbers of scientific and technical articles) and that they should reflect the 
convexity of the human capital construct in educational attainment levels (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995). These requirements are satisfied by using the adult literacy rate (ADLIT) and 
the population share of scientists and engineers (RDPERS) as human capital proxies.
19 
We estimate a linearized version of equation (2). The reason for this simple approach is the 
lack of a compelling theoretical basis for deriving a specific way in which corruption affects 
                                                           
16 It should be noted that there exists a strong multicollinearity between the first, second and third powers of 
GNPPC. As will be discussed in section 3a, this makes it difficult in some cases to infer much about the 
individual coefficients of the powers of GNPPC. This problem would be aggravated by attempting more 
flexibility through the use of higher powers. 
17 A sensitivity analysis using in addition the second power of CORR will be discussed in section 4d. Of course, 
one might explore alternative specifications, such as including income-corruption interactive terms. However, 
the aim of this paper with respect to the EKC is modest. We only want to determine whether corruption can be 
shown to intermediate between income and pollution. If the link does exist, it should show up in our model; and 
if our model can show this while making only the smallest deviation from the previous literature, so much the 
better. For similar reasoning with respect to the freedom-pollution relationship see Barrett and Graddy (2000). 
18 G-K also consider each pollutant separately. However, since they have a panel of data at their disposal, they 
use a random-effects generalized least squares estimator. 
19 Adult literacy rates have been found theoretically attractive and empirically significant in the growth 
regressions of Barro (1991). Science and technology have likely become increasingly important since the mid 
1980s, which represent the typical terminal period in the growth regression literature.    11
income. Especially, it isn't obvious how corruption should be interacted with the various 
capital variables (physical and human). In such a case of vagueness any attempt at richer 
specification would be ad hoc. We therefore choose to enter the explanatory variables 
independently and linearly in order to let the data identify a possible link between corruption 
and income without imposing any particular interaction structure.
20 To control for resource 
rents as a possible intermediating variable, we include OPEC membership.  
The estimated equation is of the following form
21: 
 
GNPPCj = β0 + β1CAPPC + β2ADLITj + β3RDPERSj +  β4OPECj +β5CORRj + vj   (5) 
 
After least-squares estimation of equation (5), the system of equations (4) and (5) is estimated 
simultaneously for an appropriate subset of pollutant indicators.  
 
3 Impacts of Income and Corruption on Pollution 
 
a)  The Income-Pollution Relationship 
Estimates of equation (4) for the twelve pollution indicators discussed in section 2b are 
displayed in Table A3 in the Appendix. The regressions control for heteroskedasticity using 
White's method. 
We first consider the 'conventional' cubic income-pollution relationship (REG 1). In view of 
the strong multicollinearity among the powers of per capita income, it is in some cases 
difficult to infer much about their individual coefficients (see the discussion of the curves 
below). However, as indicated by the p-values, the collection of income, income-squared and 
income-cubed is in most cases highly significant as a determinant of air and water pollution.
22 
If we augment this relationship by the dummy variable for OPEC membership (REG 2), we 
find that this variable is significant at the five percent level in five out of our twelve cases. 
Significant positive coefficients are found for dissolved oxygen demand, suspended solids, 
and volatile organic carbon emissions. These effects probably reflect the importance of the 
                                                           
20 Linear regressions are used in virtually all of the empirical literature on the economic effects of corruption, for 
the same reasons as discussed above. The robustness with respect to including in addition the second power of 
corruption is discussed in section 4d. 
21 The issue of potential endogeneity of corruption is not explicitly addressed in this paper, because it would be 
difficult to find an instrumental variable for corruption for the set of countries considered here. However, 
application of instrumental variable techniques by Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999) to the 
relationship between cooruption and GDP per capita strongly suggests causality from the former to the latter.  
22 In their seminal paper, G-K report similar findings. In nine out of the twelve cases considered here, the 
probability of all powers of per capita income being jointly insignificant (p-value) is less than 0.0001. The three 
cases in which the influence of income is ambiguous refer to NO2, GMS_PH and BODWAT.   12
refinery industry in these countries. The negative coefficient for SO2 emissions might be 
related to low heating requirements and the relative unimportance of heavy industry, whereas 
the negative coefficient in the case of pesticide use reflects the low importance of large-scale 
agriculture. 
The income-pollution curves that emerge from REG 1 or REG 2 are plotted in Figure 1 
(ambient pollution) and Figure 2 (environmental emissions and stresses). For those pollutants 
which are examined in both the G-K and the present paper (SO2, particles, dissolved oxygen), 
the visual shape of the respective curves is almost identical.
23 This is all the more surprising 
because the two papers use different data bases and different estimation methods.
24 It lends 
strong support to the robustness of these estimates. 
With respect to ambient pollution we find an inverted U-shaped pattern in the cases of SO2 
and NO2 over large portions of the income scale. Even though the estimated relationships turn 
up again at very high levels of income, we cannot have much confidence in the shape of the 
curves in this range because of the relatively small number of observations for countries with 
income above 17000$. It must be conceded, however, that the curve for NO2 is rather flat, 
which reflects the fragility of this relationship already noted in footnote 22. The same 
qualification applies to phosphorus. In contrast to these two cases, the inverted U-shape of the 
SO2 curve in the relevant range is quite reliable (see the t-statistics shown in Table A3). 
For total suspended particulates we find a monotonically decreasing relationship at all levels 
of income. In the case of dissolved oxygen and suspended solids, the relationship is 
decreasing up to an income level of 21000$ and 19000$ respectively. Here again, not much 
confidence should be placed in the shape of the curves at these income levels because of the 
small number of observations. The declining shape of these three curves, at least in the 
relevant income range, is quite reliable since in the underlying regressions GNPPC has a 







                                                           
23 It should be noted that G-K consider dissolved oxygen concentration, rather than dissolved oxygen demand, 
the former being an indicator of high rather than low water quality. 
24 G-K use panel data from the 1980s, taken from 42 countries (air) or 58 countries (water) and employ a 
random-effects generalized least squares estimator to account for unobserved heterogeneity across their 
observational units. The cross-section data used in the present paper do not permit such an approach.   13
 















































With respect to environmental stresses (Figure 2), we find a very flat relationship between 
income and BODWAT (industrial organic pollutants), which, again, reflects the ambiguity 
already noted in footnote 22. For the other types of pollutants, the various powers of income 
are jointly significant determinants of emissions. Even though the estimates suggest the 
existence of an interior maximum in all six cases, it is striking that the peaks appear to occur 
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The visual impressions are confirmed when examining the computed per capita income levels 
at which pollution levels attain their maximum (Table 2). In spite of differences in the data 
and estimation methods (see footnote 24), it is instructive to compare our results with those of 
G-K. For total suspended particles both studies find a decreasing income-pollution 
relationship. For sulphur dioxide, our peak-income estimate is one fourth below that of G-K.
25 
The income levels at which the SO2 and NO2 concentrations peak roughly correspond to the 
income of Sri Lanka and Guatemala, respectively. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Income at Peak Pollution Level ($ per capita) 
SO2 concentration  3068  SO2 emissions  20259 
NO2 concentration  3355  NOX emissions  27154 
TSP concentration
a 0  VOC  emissions  23531 
Dissolved oxygen demand
a 0  Fertilizer  use  13205 
Phosphorus concentration  15840  Pesticide use  19104 
Suspended solids
a  0  Industrial organic pollutants  17601 
Ambient air pollution
b  2141  Air pollutant emissions
b 23648 
Ambient water pollution
b  5280  Stresses on water quality
b 16637 
a  Because the curves for total suspended particulates, dissolved oxygen demand, and suspended solids are 
decreasing over the relevant range, the respective income levels were set to zero. 
b Unweighted average. 
 
Comparing our results for ambient pollution with those for emissions and stresses, a striking 
result is that for sulphur dioxide the peak of emissions occurs at an income 6.6 times that at 
which ambient pollution has its maximum. For nitrogen oxides the corresponding income 
levels differ by a factor of 8.1.
26 Similar discrepancies occur with respect to the averages for 
air and water, respectively. 
It is puzzling that emission levels should keep rising at income levels at which the 
corresponding ambient pollution has long exceeded its peak (viz. especially SO2 and NO2). A 
speculation which might resolve this puzzle would entail that the emissions data are less 
reliable than are the ambient pollution data, the former being downward biased in low-income 
countries. Considering that the emissions data come largely from national sources, whereas 
the ambient pollution data come from international monitoring programs, the idea of reported 
emissions being biased downward is not implausible. That this bias might be larger at lower 
                                                           
25 The G-K study refers to the 1980s, whereas our data refer to the mid 1990s. Technology, especially the fuel 
efficiency of power stations, has improved worldwide in the meantime, irrespective of income levels. (Note that 
using Z scores to measure pollution does not affect the income levels at which pollution levels peak.)   16
incomes would be consistent with the inverse relationship between income and corruption, to 
be considered below. We will get back to this issue immediately.  
 
b)  The Corruption-Pollution Relationship 
If we augment the previous regressions by the level of corruption (REG 3 and REG 4 in Table 
A3, see Appendix), we find that this regressor is positive and significant at a 5 percent 
confidence level for most indicators of ambient pollution; it is positive and significant at a 10 
percent level for all ambient pollution indicators except phosphorus in river basins. In contrast 
to ambient pollution, corruption is insignificant for all types of emissions and environmental 
stresses, with uneven signs. 
The almost unanimous significance of the corruption variable with respect to ambient 
pollution is remarkable in view of the strong correlation between corruption and income 
discussed in section 2c. It should also be noted that the inclusion of the corruption variable 
strongly improves the explanatory power of the respective regressions (R-squared and p-
value). 
The ambiguous and insignificant estimates in the case of emissions support the conjecture 
formulated above that reported emissions (in contrast to ambient pollution) could be below 
their actual levels and that the bias is an increasing function of corruption. In this case, 
inference about the likely positive effect of corruption on emissions via reduced stringency 
and enforcement of environmental laws would be obscured by the negative impact of 
corruption on the reporting of emissions. 
These doubts about the appropriateness of the environmental emissions/stresses data for our 
purposes suggest to drop environmental emissions and stresses from the subsequent analysis. 
The remainder of the paper will therefore focus on ambient pollution. 
In contrast to the 'conventional' income-pollution relationship discussed in the preceding 
section, the OPEC variable always turns out to be insignificant once corruption is introduced 
as a regressor in the ambient pollution equations.
27 Therefore we select that version of 
equation (4) in which the coefficient on OPEC is restricted to zero (REG 3) as the 
unanimously preferred specification to capture the effect on ambient pollution of income and 
corruption. In this specification, corruption is significant at least at the 5.5 percent level for all 
ambient pollution indicators except phosphorus. 
The general result based on this preferred specification is that reducing corruption by one 
standard deviation (SD) would reduce ambient pollution levels by 0.25 SD (VOC) to 0.45 SD 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 The income level at which NOX emissions peak is actually out of the sample income range.   17
(suspended solids in rivers).
28 In any case, corruption does affect pollution at given income 
levels. 
To see whether the inclusion of the corruption variable affects the previous conclusions 
concerning the income-pollution relationship, Figure 3 plots the estimated pollution levels 
based on our preferred specification against per capita income. The general shape of the 
income-pollution relationships is similar to Figure 1, but a given income level may now be 
associated with different levels of pollution, due to the influence of corruption. For SO2 and 
particles, the two pollutants which are also covered in the study of Barrett and Graddy (2000) 
on the influence of political freedoms, our pictures look very similar to theirs. 
An interesting question is how the inclusion of corruption affects the per capita income levels 
at which pollution levels attain their maximum. These income levels are shown in Table 3. In 
comparison with Table 2 we find that the income at which the SO2 concentration in urban air 
and the phosphorus concentration in rivers peak is now substantially higher, whereas it gets 
reduced to zero for NO2.  
The result for SO2 and phosphorus can be explained in terms of the following logic. Because, 
as we shall see, higher income goes along with lower corruption, omission of the corruption 
variable from the income-pollution relationship entails that the pollution-reducing effect of 
lower corruption is partly attributed to income. The pollution-reducing effect of higher 
income therefore starts at lower income levels than in the case where corruption is explicitly 
included. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
27 This suggests that the OPEC variable may have acted as a proxy for corruption. 
28 We will get back to the (direct) impact of corruption on pollution as discussed above in section 3b, where 
results based on estimating the pollution equations jointly with the corruption-income relationship are presented.   18
 





























































































Up to this point, the dependence of income on corruption and the implied indirect effect of 
corruption on pollution were ignored. These issues will now be addressed. 
 
Table 3: Estimated Income at Peak Pollution Level When Corruption is Included ($ per  
capita) 
SO2 concentration  5586  Dissolved oxygen demand  0 
NO2 concentration  0  Phosphorus concentration  17942 
TSP concentration  0  Suspended solids  0 
Ambient air pollution
a  1862  Ambient water pollution
a 5981 
a Unweighted average 
 
 
4. Total Impact of Corruption on Pollution 
 
a)  The Corruption-Income Relationship 
Table 4 shows our basic evidence on the relationship between corruption and per capita 
income. We control for heteroskedasticity so that t-statistics in parenthesis are White 
corrected. 
REG 1 presents our standard set of explanatory variables: physical capital per person and 
human capital per person, the latter being proxied by the adult literacy rate and the percentage 
of scientists and engineers.
29 Physical capital as well as the human capital proxies affect 
income positively and significantly. They jointly account for a substantial portion of the 
dispersion of per capita income across countries, as measured by R-squared. REG 2 
introduces OPEC membership as an additional explanatory variable and finds it insignificant, 
leaving the other regressors almost unaffected. 
REG 3 and REG 4 introduce the corruption level to the list of regressors. In both cases, R-
squared is increased by about 0.06, in comparison with REG 1 and REG 2, respectively. In 
REG 3, corruption affects per capita income negatively and significantly. As shown in REG 
4, OPEC membership is again insignificant.
30 
 
                                                           
29 Due to the public-good characteristics of knowledge, per capita income can be expected to depend also on 
worldwide research and development. In our regressions, such an influence is captured by the intercept. 
30 The coefficient in REG 4 is positive, while it is negative in REG 2 where it may have acted as a proxy for 
corruption.   20
Table 4: Income Regression (Dependent variable: GNPPC. Method: OLS) 









































R2  0.925 0.925 0.931 0.931 
Adjusted  R2  0.922 0.921 0.927 0.927 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis are White-corrected. 
 
Our general assessment of the regressions shown in Table 4 is that corruption plays a 
significant negative role in explaining differences in per capita income across countries. Since 
OPEC membership is insignificant, we select REG 3 as our preferred specification of the 
corruption-income relationship.
31 According to this specification, a one standard deviation 
increase in corruption reduces per capita income by 1167$.
32 The effect of corruption on 
income is about three times the effect of adult literacy: An increase in adult literacy by one 
percentage point raises per capita income by somewhat more than 17$, or likewise a one 
standard deviation increase in adult literacy raises income by about 391$. 
It may be added that our estimate of the influence of corruption on income is likely to be 
conservative since our specification takes physical capital as exogenous. As shown by Mauro 
(1995) corruption has a strong adverse effect on capital formation. This effect is ignored in 
our estimate. 
 
b)  The-Corruption-Pollution Relationship Reconsidered 
The analysis of section 3 disregarded the dependence of income on corruption as well as 
possible interdependencies between the various pollutants due to correlated errors. Now that 
preferred specifications of both the corruption-income-pollution relationship (equation (1)) 
and the corruption-income relationship (equation (2)) have been selected, we shall consider 
                                                           
31 The probability of ADLIT being insignificant in REG 3 is 6.9 percent, which we consider to be sufficiently 
low to justify inclusion of this variable. 
32 The corruption level varies between -2.24 and +1.21 SD around its mean. A one SD difference therefore 
roughly corresponds to the difference between a country with average corruption and a highly corrupt country.    21
the overall corruption-pollution relationship, taking the above interdependencies into account. 
More specifically, we will treat the preferred specifications of the equations (1) - for the six 
ambient pollution indicators - and of equation (2) as a simultaneous equation system. The 
system is recursive and includes no cross-equation restrictions on the coefficients. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to use Zellner's technique of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).
33 
The estimated equation system and the results of the SUR estimation are shown in Table A4 
in the Appendix. To facilitate the comparison with the OLS results (REG 3 in Table A3 and 
REG 3 in Table 4), Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients for the corruption variable, the 
associated t-statistics, and the R-squared of the respective regressions under OLS and SUR. 
It is noteworthy that the SUR coefficients are somewhat lower than their OLS counterparts. 
When using SUR, the impact on per capita income of a one SD increase in corruption drops 
from a 1167$ loss to a loss by 1082$. The maximum impact on pollution of a one SD increase 
in corruption drops from 0.45 to 0.40 SD (GMS_SS) while the minimum impact drops from 
0.26 to 0.21 SD (TSP). 
The t-statistics are in four cases lower under SUR than under OLS. Four out of the seven 
coefficients on CORR are significant at least at the 5 percent level, the other three at levels 
between 8 and 11 percent. 
 



































































                                                           
33 SUR takes account of heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors across equations. Estimation techniques 
more sophisticated than SUR are not required in the present case: For the model specified in equations (4) and 
(5) the matrix of coefficients of the endogenous variables is triangular, implying that its determinant is 1. Thus 
the Jacobian term in the loglikelihood function for the system (4), (5) vanishes, and the loglikelihood function 
has the same form as the loglikelihood function for a set of linear seemingly unrelated regressions (Davidson and 
McKinnon 1993, 644-645).    22
Given that the simultaneity bias in our previous estimates implied an overstatement of the 
impacts of corruption on both income and pollution, an interesting question relates to the 
possibility of biases in our assessment of the income-pollution relationship. The most 
convenient way to address this problem is in terms of the peaks of the income-pollution 
relationship. In comparison with the peaks based on OLS as reported in Table 3, we find that 
the decreasing relationship for NO2, TSP, dissolved oxygen demand, and suspended solids is 
confirmed by the SUR estimation. For SO2 the peak is slightly higher under SUR than under 
OLS (5728 $ instead of 5586 $) , whereas for phosphorus concentration it is somewhat lower 
(17406 $ instead of 17942 $). The basic conclusions on the income-pollution relationship 
from section 3 thus remain valid. 
 
c)  The Impact of Corruption on Pollution 
We are now ready to examine the total effect of corruption on pollution, as well as its 
composition in terms of the direct effect (via reduced stringency of environmental laws and 
environmental law enforcement) and the indirect effect (based on corruption's impact on 
prosperity), see equation (3). 
In Figure 4, the effect on pollution of a one SD increase in corruption is plotted against per 
capita income. The effects are also expressed in terms of standard deviation units. The shape 




                                                           
34 The indirect effects shown in Figure 4 are the slopes of the income-pollution relationships as shown in Figure 
3, multiplied by the negative coefficient which measures the impact of corruption on income. Consider, e.g., 
SO2, which according to Figure 3 rises in income at low income levels. Because corruption reduces income, it 
leads to lower SO2 through this channel as long as income is low. Consequently, the indirect effect shown in 
Figure 4 is negative at low income levels. At higher income levels, SO2 decreases with income but, since 
corruption reduces income, the indirect effect of corruption on SO2 is now slightly positive. Finally, when 
income is very high, SO2 slightly increases in income, and the indirect corruption effect becomes negative. The 
qualitative shape of the indirect effect is, of course, transferred to the total effect. The same way of reasoning 
applies to the other pollutants.   23
 





























































Consider first the indirect effect. Except for TSP and dissolved oxygen demand there exist 
income ranges at which the indirect effect of corruption on pollution is negative. That is, the 
reduction in income brought about by increased corruption may actually reduce pollution at 
some ranges of income. However, if present, this negative effect is rather small and 
dominated by the positive direct effect at all income levels. 
An important result is that at low income levels there is a strong positive indirect effect of 
corruption on total suspended particles, dissolved oxygen demand, and suspended solids. This 
means that fighting corruption in low-income countries could substantially reduce these types 
of pollution, just by raising the income level. 
With respect to the total effect of corruption on pollution, we find that it is positive for all 
pollutants considered and over the whole range of income. Similar to the indirect effect, the 
total effect on total suspended particles, dissolved oxygen demand, and suspended solids is 
strongest in poor countries. For phosphorus concentration in rivers, the effect is stronger in 
poor countries than in middle-income countries, though not stronger than in rich countries.
35  
A compact presentation of the magnitudes involved is given in Table 6, which shows the 
maximum and minimum effects of a one SD increase in corruption, differentiated by direct, 
indirect, and total effect. 
 
Table 6: Maximum and Minimum Effects of a one SD Increase in Corruption 


















































The maximum total effect of a one SD increase in corruption is between 0.3 SD (NO2) and 
almost 0.7 SD (suspended solids). The minimum total effect is between 0.2 SD (SO2) and 
almost 0.4 (dissolved oxygen demand). 
                                                           
35 It should, however, be recalled from our discussion of the income-pollution relationship that - because of the 
number of observations available - the confidence to be placed in the estimated relationships is lower at high 
income levels than at low and middle income levels.   25
To make these results more vivid, note that a one SD reduction in corruption would take a 
high-corruption country close to the average corruption level. For a country suffering from the 
highest NO2 levels, this would imply that NO2 gets reduced from 3.8 SD above average to 
about 3.5 above average. For a country with high phosphorus pollution, the corresponding 
reduction would be from 4.1 SD above average to 3.5 SD above average in the most favorable 
case ('maximum' in Table 6). In the most unfavorable case ('minimum' in Table 6) there 
would be a reduction to 3.9 SD above average. 
Even though our results represent purely statistical relationships, it may be useful to illustrate 
them by way of an example. Consider the case of Burundi, which is ranked as highly corrupt 
(1.2 SD above average), and Peru, whose corruption level is more moderate (0.2 above 
average). If the corruption level of Burundi were reduced down to the level prevailing in Peru, 
this would be associated with an increase of Burundi's per capita income from less than one 
fifth to somewhat more than one half the level of Peru. With respect to pollution such a 
reduced corruption level would be associated with a substantial decline in total suspended 
particles (from 1.65 to 1.1 SD above average), dissolved oxygen demand (from 1.4 to 0.85 
SD) and suspended solids (from 1.65 to 1.0 SD.) 
This illustrates the probably most important conclusion to be drawn from our results, namely 
that reducing corruption is especially important for poor countries, not only for economic, but 
also for environmental reasons. 
 
d) Robustness 
The robustness of our results was checked with respect to the linear specification of the effect 
of corruption in equations (4) and (5). Reestimating a version of the system in which all 
equations are augmented by corruption-squared, to test for nonlinearity of the effects of 
corruption, yields insignificant estimates for corruption-squared in five out of the six pollution 
equations. Only for phosphorus concentration the squared term was found to be significant at 
a level below 5 percent. The squared term was also insignificant in the income equation. We 
conclude from these results that it is generally appropriate to take the direct effect of 
corruption on pollution as well as the effect on income to be linear. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper investigated the impact of corruption on pollution via two channels: (a) reduced 
stringency of environmental laws and their enforcement (direct effect), and (b) reduced levels 
of per capita income (indirect effect). Using six indicators of ambient air and water pollution,   26
we found that pollution is monotonically increasing in corruption. In terms of the indirect 
effect which contributes to this overall result, corruption may reduce or enhance pollution, 
depending on the income level. However, even if corruption reduces pollution via its effect on 
income, this indirect effect is invariably dominated by the direct effect.  
In quantitative terms, the maximum total effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
corruption is between 0.3 standard deviations in the case of nitrogen oxide concentration in 
urban air and almost 0.7 standard deviations in the case of suspended solids in river basins. 
The minimum total effect is between 0.2 standard deviations in the case of sulphur dioxide 
concentration in urban air and almost 0.4 standard deviations in the case of dissolved oxygen 
demand in rivers. 
From a policy point of view, the most important result appears to be that, for most pollutants, 
the effect of corruption on pollution is particularly strong in low-income countries. Reducing 
corruption is therefore especially important for the less developed regions. By reducing 
corruption, low-income countries could considerably improve both their economic and 
environmental conditions. With rising income, a better environmental quality would become 
desirable and 'affordable'. At the same time, lower corruption would allow this demand for a 
better environment to become satisfied in terms of stricter environmental laws and stricter 
enforcement of these laws. Reducing corruption therefore seems to be of key importance for 
improving environmental quality especially in developing countries.   27
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
 
 ADLIT  BODWAT  CAPPC  CORR  FERTHA  GMS_DO 
 Mean   75.87097  0.000   27902.25  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Median   83.00000   0.020   18033.74   0.330   0.225   0.235 
 Maximum   98.00000   4.250   109097.8   1.210   1.640   1.920 
 Minimum   14.00000  -0.900   330.2996  -2.240  -2.760  -2.330 
 Std. Dev.   22.85409   1.000   29441.49   1.000   1.000  1.000 
  Observations  93 122 95 122  122  122 
 
 
 GMS_PH  GMS_SS  GNPPC  NO2  NOXKM  OPEC 
 Mean  -0.000  -0.000   7167.736   0.000  0.000   0.081 
 Median   0.070   0.195   4145.000   0.095  -0.120   0.000 
 Maximum   4.120   1.770   25880.00   3.810   2.250   1.000 
 Minimum  -1.110  -2.480   330.0000  -2.810  -1.960   0.000 
 Std. Dev.   1.000   1.000   7043.588   1.000   1.000   0.275 
  Observations  122 122 106 122 122 122 
 
 
 PESTHA  RDPERS  SO2  SO2KM  TSP  VOCKM 
 Mean   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
  Median  -0.355 -0.455   0.130 -0.340   0.125 -0.040 
 Maximum   4.060   2.640   3.520   4.940   1.770   2.220 
  Minimum  -0.700 -1.530 -1.520 -0.520 -1.740 -1.680 
 Std. Dev.   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000 
  Observations  122 122 122 122 122   122 
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Table A2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 ADLIT  BODWAT  CAPPC  CORR  FERTHA  GMS_DO 
ADLIT   1.000   0.045   0.664  -0.615   0.602  -0.619 
BODWAT   0.045   1.000   0.030  -0.063   0.132   0.018 
CAPPC   0.664   0.030   1.000  -0.867   0.514  -0.739 
CORR  -0.615  -0.063  -0.867   1.000  -0.561   0.757 
FERTHA   0.602   0.132   0.514  -0.561   1.000  -0.507 
GMS_DO  -0.619   0.018  -0.739   0.757  -0.507   1.000 
GMS_PH   0.002   0.929  -0.081   0.059   0.078   0.164 
GMS_SS  -0.686  -0.120  -0.790   0.821  -0.615   0.833 
GNPPC   0.676   0.136   0.950  -0.884   0.585  -0.741 
NO2  -0.038   0.036  -0.085   0.170  -0.019  -0.010 
NOXKM   0.407   0.283   0.596  -0.581   0.362  -0.443 
OPEC  -0.002  -0.124  -0.039   0.240  -0.009   0.185 
PESTHA   0.436   0.236   0.367  -0.388   0.547  -0.368 
RDPERS   0.622   0.155   0.883  -0.835   0.511  -0.759 
SO2  -0.375  -0.000  -0.589   0.582  -0.282   0.409 
SO2KM   0.325   0.346   0.379  -0.377   0.365  -0.307 
TSP  -0.673  -0.046  -0.790   0.764  -0.566   0.754 




 GMS_PH  GMS_SS  GNPPC  NO2  NOXKM  OPEC 
ADLIT   0.002  -0.686   0.676  -0.038   0.407  -0.002 
BODWAT   0.929  -0.120   0.136   0.036   0.283  -0.124 
CAPPC  -0.081  -0.790   0.950  -0.085   0.596  -0.039 
CORR   0.059   0.821  -0.884   0.170  -0.581   0.240 
FERTHA   0.078  -0.615   0.585  -0.019   0.362  -0.009 
GMS_DO   0.164   0.833  -0.741  -0.010  -0.443   0.185 
GMS_PH   1.000   0.004   0.004   0.048   0.215   0.011 
GMS_SS   0.004   1.000  -0.806   0.120  -0.574   0.142 
GNPPC   0.004  -0.806   1.000  -0.057   0.657  -0.085 
NO2   0.048   0.120  -0.057   1.000  -0.003   0.061 
NOXKM   0.215  -0.574   0.657  -0.003   1.000  -0.126 
OPEC   0.011   0.142  -0.085   0.061  -0.126   1.000 
PESTHA   0.172  -0.420   0.484   0.166   0.433  -0.112 
RDPERS   0.020  -0.801   0.904  -0.110   0.671  -0.120 
SO2   0.045   0.506  -0.571   0.220  -0.303  -0.010 
SO2KM   0.341  -0.445   0.440   0.058   0.630  -0.100 
TSP   0.099   0.842  -0.796   0.211  -0.482   0.061 
VOCKM   0.242  -0.260   0.348   0.043   0.861   0.092 
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 PESTHA  RDPERS  SO2  SO2KM  TSP  VOCKM 
ADLIT   0.436   0.622  -0.375   0.325  -0.673   0.161 
BODWAT   0.236   0.155  -0.000   0.346  -0.046   0.255 
CAPPC   0.367   0.883  -0.589   0.379  -0.790   0.272 
CORR  -0.388  -0.835   0.582  -0.377   0.764  -0.231 
FERTHA   0.547   0.511  -0.282   0.365  -0.566   0.219 
GMS_DO  -0.368  -0.759   0.409  -0.307   0.754  -0.126 
GMS_PH   0.172   0.020   0.045   0.341   0.099   0.242 
GMS_SS  -0.420  -0.801   0.506  -0.445   0.842  -0.260 
GNPPC   0.484   0.904  -0.571   0.440  -0.796   0.348 
NO2   0.166  -0.110   0.220   0.058   0.211   0.043 
NOXKM   0.433   0.671  -0.303   0.630  -0.482   0.861 
OPEC  -0.112  -0.120  -0.010  -0.100   0.061   0.092 
PESTHA   1.000   0.378  -0.147   0.452  -0.340   0.336 
RDPERS   0.378   1.000  -0.521   0.413  -0.744   0.353 
SO2  -0.147  -0.521   1.000  -0.165   0.504  -0.161 
SO2KM   0.452   0.413  -0.165   1.000  -0.340   0.510 
TSP  -0.340  -0.744   0.504  -0.340   1.000  -0.187 
VOCKM   0.336   0.353  -0.161   0.510  -0.187   1.000   32
Table A3: Regression Results 
 
SO2 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST 0,1959907 0,1930068 -0,1073133  -0,1968918
 (-1,2949339) (-1,2552259) (-0.4744701)  (-0.764094)
GNP 9,81E-05 0,0001033 0,0001315  0,0001619
 (-1,0969902) (-1,0959688)) (-1,3996516)  (1.5303421)
GNP2 -1,84E-08 -1,90E-08 -1,50E-08 -1,66E-08
 (-2,1740594) (-2,1021677) (-1,9154804)  (-1,9702027)
GNP3 5,24E-13 5,41E-13 3,87E-13  4,22E-13
 (2,4655982) (2,3562786) (2,0255829)  (2,0556039)
OPEC -0,1161561   -0,4811255
 (-0,461357)   (-1,6044446)
CORR 0,3532654  0,4432046
 (2,5449412)  (2,642717)
R2 0,2470019 0,2477283 0,2765965  0,2871396
R2A 0,2248549 0,2179353 0,2479469  0,2514966
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
   
NO2 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST 0,0377756 0,0412451 -0,3112599  -0,3552071
 (0,216975) (0,2331596) (-1,2536828)  (-1,20237)
GNP 3,65E-05 3,04E-05 7,50E-05  8,99E-05
 (0,3044001) (0,2414242) (0,6134514)  (0,6651726)
GNP2 -6,49E-09 -5,81E-09 -2,60E-09 -3,37E-09
 (-0,5249173) (-0,4484647) (-0,2120103)  (-0,2682833)
GNP3 2,08E-13 1,89E-13 5,14E-14  6,86E-14
 (0,6347712) (0,548565) (0,1552623)  (0,206285)
OPEC 0,1350637   -0,2360403
 (0,809179)   (-0,750394)
CORR 0,4065301  0,4506542
 (1,9345448)  (1,747928)
R2 0,0100492 0,0109472 0,0458885  0,0482091
R2A -0,019067 -0,0282232 0,008102  0,0006195
p-value 0.79 0.89 0.31  0.41
   
TSP Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST 1,2927813 1,3027934 1,0737558  1,1132971
 (7,7548999) (7,7887953) (4,9008074)  (4,8909263)
GNP -3,53E-04 -0,0003705 -0,0003286  -0,000342
 (-4,6217197) (-4,8302601) (-4,0541429)  (-4,0225087)
GNP2 1,76E-08 1,95E-08 2,00E-08  2,07E-08
 (2,5507478) (2,8663171) (3,1733596)  (3,1995543)
GNP3 -3,13E-13 -3,69E-13 -4,11E-13 -4,27E-13
 (-1,8086545) (-2,2243881) (-2,7291409)  (-2,7988049)
OPEC 0,3897563   0,212376
 (1,2680017)   (0,6305176)
CORR 0,2551043  0,2154038
 (2,1477051)  (1,6729038)
R2 0,6226984 0,6299336 0,6363524  0,6381699
R2A 0,6116013 0,6152775 0,6219505  0,6200784
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
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GMS_DO Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST 0,9967249 1,0153314 0,6290706  0,7108669
 (5,7845084) (5,8195822) (2,733394)  (2,7570866)
GNP -0,000196 -0,000229 -0,0001555  -0,0001833
 (-2,104012) (-2,4049015) (-1,7172185)  (-1,8851826)
GNP2 2,58E-09 6,23E-09 6,67E-09  8,10E-09
 (0,2999865) (0,7130675) (0,8034238)  (0,9537323)
GNP3 7,78E-14 -2,72E-14 -8,75E-14 -1,20E-13
 (0,3694385) (-0,1286479) (-0,4195604)  (-0,5649547)
OPEC 0,7243247   0,4393269
 (3,1390009)   (1,4662598)
CORR 0,4282158  0,3460902
 (2,5480332)  (1,736435)
R2 0,5248604 0,5498736 0,5633719  0,5711573
R2A 0,5108857 0,5320468 0,5460797  0,5497152
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
   
   
GMS_PH Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -0,0041548 0,0001129 -0,3401403  -0,3744959
 (-0,030571) (0,0008259) (-1,3941068)  (-1,3665881)
GNP -4,70E-05 -5,46E-05 -9,99E-06  1,67E-06
 (-0,5384869) (-0,6198572) (-0,1175433)  (0,0195272)
GNP2 8,12E-09 8,96E-09 1,19E-08  1,13E-08
 (0,8198223) (0,9039185) (1,0823973)  (1,0644059)
GNP3 -2,79E-13 -3,04E-13 -4,31E-13 -4,17E-13
 (-0,995811) (-1,0850295) (-1,3240175)  (-1,3205576)
OPEC 0,1661336   -0,1845236
 (0,4168421)   (-0,3653791)
CORR 0,3913305  0,4258244
 (1,5319206)  (1,4583678)
R2 0,0138828 0,0154042 0,051069  0,0526569
R2A -0,0151206 -0,0235896 0,0134875  0,0052898
p-value 0.70 0.81 0.25  0.36
   
   
GMS_SS Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST 1,2000993 1,2147464 0,815478  0,8597738
 (7,725645) (7,8511954) (4,2034517)  (4,1873149)
GNP -2,74E-04 -0,0002994 -0,0002311  -0,0002461
 (-3,8222959) (-4,1852891) (-3,3158475)  (-3,3220338)
GNP2 6,19E-09 9,07E-09 1,05E-08  1,13E-08
 (0,9658583) (1,4087537) (1,7195125)  (1,7929961)
GNP3 4,67E-14 -3,60E-14 -1,26E-13 -1,44E-13
 (0,2825769) (-0,2184857) (-0,7766973)  (-0,8665641)
OPEC 0,5701888   0,2379124
 (3,293833)   (1,5041457)
CORR 0,4479777  0,4035036
 (3,9222279)  (3,1929638)
R2 0,6813303 0,6965716 0,7227741  0,7250191
R2A 0,6719577 0,6845546 0,7117949  0,7112701
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
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NOXKM Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -0,5744888 -0,5838907 -0,5513028  -0,6269513
 (-2,5657497) (-2,6022307) (-2,0783455)  (-2,3008571)
GNP 5,84E-05 7,50E-05 5,58E-05  8,15E-05
 (0,6059946) (0,7656305) (0,576725)  (0,8176475)
GNP2 3,74E-09 1,90E-09 3,48E-09  2,16E-09
 (0,4300588) (0,2107888) (0,3845807)  (0,2352369)
GNP3 -1,18E-13 -6,52E-14 -1,08E-13 -7,82E-14
 (-0,5462546) (-0,2858841) (-0,4606401)  (-0,328106)
OPEC -0,3659997   -0,4063072
 (-1,7224636)   (-1,553522)
CORR -0,0270053  0,0489477
 (-0,1445295)  (0,2387864)
R2 0,3687475 0,3756644 0,3689134  0,3761255
R2A 0,3501812 0,3509382 0,3439198  0,3449317
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
   
   
SO2KM Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -0,4856053 -0,4968131 -0,5830336  -0,6996104
 (-2,8901697) (-2,9357239) (-2,0950458)  (-2,2086789)
GNP 6,01E-05 7,99E-05 7,08E-05  0,0001104
 (0,5630096) (0,7321291) (0,6394898)  (0,9298423)
GNP2 5,36E-09 3,16E-09 6,45E-09  4,41E-09
 (0,4949317) (0,2860612) (0,5745813)  (0,3933951)
GNP3 -2,72E-13 -2,09E-13 -3,16E-13 -2,71E-13
 (-0,9760915) (-0,7341072) (-1,055576)  (-0,9131172)
OPEC -0,436302   -0,626133
 (-2,8096456)   (-1,899402)
CORR 0,1134772  0,2305233
 (0,4518432)  (0,7861926)
R2 0,1590992 0,1683038 0,1618421  0,1778807
R2A 0,1343668 0,1353654 0,1286477  0,1367748
p-value <0.0001 0.001 0.001  0.001
   
   
VOCKM Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -0,2088442 -0,1897272 -0,4833715  -0,3775466
 (-0,748526) (-0,6834037) (-1,5346272)  (-1,1404336)
GNP -4,61E-05 -8,00E-05 -1,59E-05 -5,18E-05
 (-0,3949736) (-0,6856801) (-0,1375579)  (-0,4368491)
GNP2 9,02E-09 1,28E-08 1,21E-08  1,39E-08
 (0,8011963) (1,1614216) (1,0755798)  (1,2528296)
GNP3 -2,06E-13 -3,14E-13 -3,29E-13 -3,71E-13
 (-0,6724338) (-1,0869475) (-1,0836545)  (-1,2565433)
OPEC 0,7441951   0,5683844
 (5,0739885)   (2,5688748)
CORR 0,3197486  0,2134976
 (1,6469945)  (0,9606118)
R2 0,1753956 0,204095 0,1987344  0,2128985
R2A 0,1511425 0,1725741 0,1670011  0,1735434
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
   
     35
FERTHA Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -1,3337268 -1,3357853 -1,2186598  -1,2120071
 (-6,3575618) (-6,3504668) (-5,4766131)  (-5,2403418)
GNP 0,0004329 0,0004365 0,0004202  0,000418
 (5,75E+00) (5,6990312) (5,6408563)  (5,4081508)
GNP2 -2,67E-08 -2,71E-08 -2,79E-08 -2,78E-08
 (-3,93E+00) (-3,8730201) (-4,0067137)  (-3,9493196)
GNP3 5,18E-13 5,30E-13 5,70E-13  5,67E-13
 (3,00E+00) (2,9419008) (3,0985618)  (3,0625493)
OPEC -0,0801325   0,0357316
 (-0,3959987)   (0,148736)
CORR -0,1340214  -0,1407009
 (-1,1058992)  (-0,9913592)
R2 0,5150283 0,5153758 0,51931  0,5193684
R2A 0,5007645 0,4961828 0,5002727  0,4953368
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
   
   
PESTHA Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -0,5740387 -0,5817842 -0,7380751  -0,83905
 (-4,4834488) (-4,5096021) (-3,4802035)  (-3,67787)
GNP 4,78E-05 6,15E-05 6,59E-05  0,0001001
 (0,5832162) (0,7355246) (0,7703302)  (1,1166535)
GNP2 7,81E-09 6,29E-09 9,63E-09  7,87E-09
 (8,05E-01) (0,6350328) (0,9931629)  (0,8015732)
GNP3 -3,19E-13 -2,76E-13 -3,93E-13 -3,54E-13
 (-1,17E+00) (-0,9815239) (-1,4117755)  (-1,2559457)
OPEC -0,3015185   -0,5423353
 (-2,4553671)   (-2,4806721)
CORR 0,1910571  0,2924386
 (1,0555209)  (1,4551757)
R2 0,2989715 0,3038974 0,307684  0,3211673
R2A 0,278353 0,276329 0,2802656  0,2872257
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001
   
   
BODWAT Reg1 Reg2 Reg3  Reg4
CONST -0,1024486 -0,1115878 -0,4033662  -0,5451719
 (-0,7849175) (-0,8357701) (-1,6664256)  (-1,9988574)
GNP -4,32E-05 -2,70E-05 -1,00E-05  3,81E-05
 (-5,09E-01) (-0,3082138) (-0,1203417)  (0,4324391)
GNP2 9,31E-09 7,52E-09 1,27E-08  1,02E-08
 (9,56E-01) (0,7526685) (1,1656777)  (0,9557801)
GNP3 -3,06E-13 -2,55E-13 -4,41E-13 -3,86E-13
 (-1,10E+00) (-0,8877342) (-1,3433573)  (-1,1986617)
OPEC -0,3557758   -0,7616376
 (-1,6680916)   (-2,2581965)
CORR 0,350486  0,4928627
 (1,4061103)  (1,7578666)
R2 0,035881 0,0429486 0,0660958  0,0935
R2A 0,0075246 0,0050455 0,0291095  0,048175
p-value 0.29 0.35 0.14  0.08
   36





R-squared  0.930996     Mean dependent var  7667.407 
Adjusted R-squared  0.927364     S.D. dependent var  7342.937 
S.E. of regression  1978.996     Sum squared resid  2.98E+08 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.282705      
Equation: SO2=C(11)+C(12)*GNPPC+C(13)*GNPPC^2+C(14)*GNPPC^3+C(15)*CORR 
Observations: 106 
R-squared  0.276548     Mean dependent var  -0.001792 
Adjusted R-squared  0.247897     S.D. dependent var  0.980256 
S.E. of regression  0.850116     Sum squared resid  72.99249 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.953807      
Equation: NO2=C(21)+C(22)*GNPPC+C(23)*GNPPC^2+C(24)*GNPPC^3+C(25)*CORR 
Observations: 106 
R-squared  0.044963     Mean dependent var  0.024151 
Adjusted R-squared  0.007139     S.D. dependent var  1.025079 
S.E. of regression  1.021413     Sum squared resid  105.3717 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.921381      
Equation: TSP=C(31)+C(32)*GNPPC+C(33)*GNPPC^2+C(34)*GNPPC^3+C(35)*CORR 
Observations: 106 
R-squared  0.635569     Mean dependent var  -0.037264 
Adjusted R-squared  0.621136     S.D. dependent var  1.042154 
S.E. of regression  0.641465     Sum squared resid  41.55927 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.665968      
Equation: GMS_DO=C(41)+C(42)*GNPPC+C(43)*GNPPC^2+C(44) *GNPPC^3+ 
                                  C(45)*CORR 
Observations: 106 
R-squared  0.561810     Mean dependent var  -0.008396 
Adjusted R-squared  0.544456     S.D. dependent var  1.041626 
S.E. of regression  0.703035     Sum squared resid  49.92014 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.056768      
Equation: GMS_PH=C(51)+C(52)*GNPPC+C(53)*GNPPC^2+C(54) *GNPPC^3+ 
                                  C(55)*CORR 
Observations: 106 
R-squared  0.048060     Mean dependent var  -0.030472 
Adjusted R-squared  0.010359     S.D. dependent var  0.968719 
S.E. of regression  0.963688     Sum squared resid  93.79816 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.385182      
Equation: GMS_SS=C(61)+C(62)*GNPPC+C(63)*GNPPC^2+C(64) *GNPPC^3+ 
                                  C(65)*CORR 
Observations: 106 
R-squared  0.722068     Mean dependent var  -0.053113 
Adjusted R-squared  0.711061     S.D. dependent var  1.050440 
S.E. of regression  0.564644     Sum squared resid  32.20107 
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  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C(1) 2471.149 1001.451 2.467568  0.0138 
C(2) 0.134556 0.017110 7.864262  0.0000 
C(3) 18.03107 12.70216 1.419527  0.1562 
C(4) 1667.624 443.3781 3.761179  0.0002 
C(5) -1082.246 417.1904 -2.594130  0.0097 
C(11) -0.092878 0.257523 -0.360657  0.7185 
C(12) 0.000128 9.49E-05 1.350554  0.1773 
C(13) -1.49E-08 9.50E-09 -1.563519  0.1184 
C(14) 3.83E-13 2.67E-13 1.432234  0.1525 
C(15) 0.342588 0.169625 2.019685  0.0438 
C(21) -0.245142 0.308783 -0.793896  0.4275 
C(22) 5.97E-05 0.000114 0.525090  0.5997 
C(23) -1.86E-09 1.14E-08 -0.163510  0.8702 
C(24) 3.10E-14 3.20E-13 0.096760  0.9229 
C(25) 0.357626 0.203433 1.757960  0.0792 
C(31) 1.135569 0.193403 5.871513  0.0000 
C(32) -0.000343 7.12E-05 -4.817132  0.0000 
C(33) 2.07E-08 7.12E-09 2.905010  0.0038 
C(34) -4.30E-13 2.00E-13 -2.147568  0.0321 
C(35) 0.209384 0.127454 1.642818  0.1009 
C(41) 0.716336 0.211282 3.390418  0.0007 
C(42) -0.000176 7.77E-05 -2.261131  0.0241 
C(43) 7.65E-09 7.77E-09 0.985202  0.3249 
C(44) -1.14E-13 2.18E-13 -0.523606  0.6007 
C(45) 0.363671 0.139285 2.610974  0.0092 
C(51) -0.227503 0.289884 -0.784808  0.4328 
C(52) -3.60E-05 0.000107 -0.337657  0.7357 
C(53) 1.31E-08 1.07E-08 1.231480  0.2186 
C(54) -4.65E-13 3.00E-13 -1.551231  0.1213 
C(55) 0.308019 0.191084 1.611962  0.1074 
C(61) 0.874647 0.170089 5.142284  0.0000 
C(62) -0.000245 6.26E-05 -3.911185  0.0001 
C(63) 1.11E-08 6.26E-09 1.780054  0.0755 
C(64) -1.45E-13 1.76E-13 -0.820841  0.4120 
C(65) 0.404214 0.112101 3.605796  0.0003 
 